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 THE BASIS OF UNIT SELF-DEFENSE AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE USE OF FORCE 
CHARLES P. TRUMBULL IV* 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the most important responsibilities for a military commander is 
the protection of his or her own troops. Military personnel are informed 
that they have a right, and even an obligation, to use force to defend 
themselves and their units against attack or imminent attack. This right, 
often called “unit self-defense,” is recognized by militaries around the 
world and serves as a key element of militaries’ Rules of Engagement 
(ROE).1 
A significant amount of legal scholarship has focused on the meaning 
of national self-defense under international law, particularly following the 
September 11 attacks and the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. Legal scholars, 
practitioners, and international courts have parsed the meaning of “armed 
attack,”2 argued over the legitimacy of anticipatory self-defense,3 and 
debated application of the Caroline doctrine4 in states that are unwilling or 
unable to prevent armed attacks by non-state actors.5 These articles 
 
          *   The author is an attorney-adviser for the Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of 
State. This Article was written in the author’s private capacity and does not necessarily reflect the views 
of the U.S. Department of State or the U.S. Government. The author wishes to thank Alexandra Perina, 
Maegan Conklin, Rebecca Ingber, Mike Meier, Stephen Townley, Steve Pomper, and LTC Gary Corn 
for insightful comments on earlier drafts of this Article.  
 1.  J. Ashley Roach, Rules of Engagement, 14 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 865, 870 (1983).  
 2.  See, e.g., TOM RUYS, ARMED ATTACK AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER: EVOLUTIONS 
IN CUSTOMARY LAW AND PRACTICE (2011).   
 3.  See, e.g., Sean Murphy, The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense, 50 VILL. L. REV. 699 
(2005).  
 4.  The 1837 case of The Caroline provides the basic rules for the use of anticipatory self-
defense. The dispute arose when UK troops set fire to a steamer called The Caroline, located on the 
U.S. side of the Niagara River, which had been used to transport Canadian rebels across the border to 
commit attacks against British forces. The United States strongly objected to the Brits’ use of force 
within its territory. After the British argued that its actions were justified under the right of self-defense, 
the U.S. Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, demanded that the British show that the necessity of self-
defense had been “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for 
deliberation.” For a more thorough discussion of this case, see generally Martin A. Rogoff & Edward 
Collins, Jr., The Caroline Incident and the Development of International Law, 16 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 
493 (1990).  
 5.  See Ashley Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for 
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generally focus on when and how states can use force against another state, 
or within the territory of another state, in self-defense. Yet there has been 
little attention to when soldiers can use force under international law to 
defend themselves against attacks or threatened attacks. 
In particular, the source and scope of the right of unit self-defense has 
not been carefully examined in academic literature. Military ROEs assert 
the right of unit self-defense and numerous articles presuppose that such a 
right exists—it seems intuitive that this must be the case. Yet there is no 
clear source for this right as it is not codified in any international 
convention or treaty. Perhaps for this reason, several scholars have stated 
that the right of unit self-defense must be a subset of the right of national 
self-defense reflected in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.6 But, as 
this Article argues, the right of unit self-defense does not fit comfortably 
within the national self-defense framework. 
This is the first thorough examination of the jurisprudential basis for 
unit self-defense in military Rules of Engagement under international law.7 
This Article argues that the right of unit self-defense is derived from 
customary international law and that it must be separate and distinct from 
the right of national self-defense. This is not a purely academic distinction, 
as states are required to report all actions taken in national self-defense to 
the U.N. Security Council. Moreover, maintaining a distinction between 
unit and national self-defense would mitigate concerns generated by the 
International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) conservative interpretation of the right 
of national self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. 
Part I of this Article describes the concept of unit self-defense, 
drawing on various countries’ Rules of Engagement. Part II critiques the 
arguments that unit self-defense is a subset of national self-defense, noting 
key differences regarding when and how these rights can be exercised. Part 
III explains that unit self-defense, although not derived from Article 51, is 
nevertheless recognized under customary international law, as evidenced 
by state practice and opinio juris. Part IV argues that understanding unit 
 
Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 483 (2012).  
 6.  “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council 
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” U.N. Charter art. 51.  
 7.  This Article is primarily concerned with the exercise of unit self-defense during peacetime, 
when soldiers are not acting as combatants and, thus, do not have authority to target enemy forces. In 
situations of armed conflict, the use of force is governed by jus in bello. The right of unit self-defense 
during armed conflict is less relevant than in peacetime, as combatants’ authority to use force against 
enemy combatants is not limited to situations of self-defense. Nevertheless, unit self-defense may be 
relevant during armed conflict in situations in which units are attacked by non-combatants, or other 
civilians who are not considered to be directly participating in hostilities.  
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self-defense as an independent right can help make sense of several of the 
perceived inconsistencies in the ICJ’s jurisprudence on self-defense, most 
notably in the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
Against Nicaragua.8 Part V discusses the similarities between individual 
and unit self-defense, and raises some additional questions that warrant 
further attention in the academic literature. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF UNIT SELF-DEFENSE 
The right of unit self-defense is “fundamental to all international 
military codes” and Rules of Engagement.9 It “allows a commander, or an 
individual soldier, sailor or airman the automatic authority to defend his or 
her unit, or him or herself, in certain well defined circumstances.”10 United 
States’ military doctrine has traditionally defined “unit self-defense” as 
follows: “The act of defending a particular US force element, including 
individual personnel thereof, and other US forces in the vicinity, against a 
hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.”11 
Unit self-defense is “an inherent right and not dependent or contingent 
on a mandate or mission.”12 In the United States military, unit self-defense 
is considered both a “right and obligation.”13 This right extends to the 
entire unit, regardless of its nature, which in this context can consist of “an 
army platoon, a ship, an aircraft, or can encompass a national or 
 
 8.  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 
1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).  
 9. Dale Stephens, Rules of Engagement and the Concept of Unit Self Defense, 45 NAVAL L. REV. 
126, 126 (1998). Rules of Engagement “are issued by competent authorities and assist in the delineation 
of the circumstances and limitations within which military force may be employed to achieve their 
objectives.” INT’L INSTITUTE OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, RULES OF ENGAGEMENT HANDBOOK 1, (2009) 
[hereinafter SANREMO HANDBOOK]. Many countries’ ROEs are classified. Accordingly, this Article 
draws primarily on the United States Standard Rules of Engagement, de-classified ROEs from other US 
operations, the SANREMO HANDBOOK, and academic writings that discuss other countries’ ROEs. 
 10.  Stephens, supra note 9, at 126; see also Hans Boddens Hosang, Force Protection, Unit Self-
Defence, and Extended Self-Defence, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY 
OPERATIONS 420 (Terry D. Gill & Dieter Fleck eds., 2010) (“Unit self-defence consists of the right of a 
commander to take all necessary measures to defend his unit against an (imminent) attack.”).  
 11.  CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION 3121.01A, STANDING RULES OF 
ENGAGEMENT FOR US FORCES A-4 (2000) (hereinafter 2000 SROE)  An updated version of the SROE 
went into effect in 2005.  The 2005 SROE are classified, but include an unclassified attachment.  This 
Article will thus draw from both the 2000 SROE and the unclassified portion of the 2005 SROE.  The 
unclassified portion of the 2005 SROE refers to unit self-defense in the definition of “inherent right of 
self-defense.”  See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3121.01B, A-2 (June 13, 2005) 
(reprinted in INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE 
GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 82-96 (2011) 
(hereinafter 2005 SROE).  
 12.  Hosang, supra note 10, at 426. 
 13.  2000 SROE, supra note 11, at A-5; 2005 SROE, supra note 11 at A-2. 
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international task force which is operating as a single unit.”14 In most 
circumstances, however, it does not apply to the protection of non-military 
personnel and property or to foreign forces.15 
Pursuant to the SROE, unit commanders “always retain the inherent 
right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense in response to a hostile act 
or demonstrated hostile intent.”16 A “hostile act” generally refers to “an 
attack,” while “hostile intent” means the “threat of imminent attack”17 and 
is “manifested by actions which are immediately preparatory to that armed 
attack.”18 According to the United States Commander’s Handbook on the 
Law of Naval Operations (“Commander’s Handbook”), “[t]he 
determination of whether or not an attack is imminent will be based on an 
assessment of all facts and circumstances known to U.S. forces at the time 
and may be made at any level.”19 This determination, often made “in a 
dynamic operational context on the basis of incomplete and often 
conflicting information,” is one of the more difficult decisions for a 
commander.20 
After unit self-defense is triggered, the use of force may be exercised 
“so long as the hostile act or hostile intent continues.”21 In all 
circumstances, the use of force must be both necessary and proportional to 
the underlying threat or attack.22 In many national ROEs, “[d]eadly force is 
to be used only when all lesser means have failed or cannot be reasonably 
 
 14.  Hosang, supra note 10, at 420.  
 15.  Richard J. Grunawalt, The JCS Standing Rules of Engagement: A Judge Advocate’s Primer, 
42 A.F. L. REV. 245, 252 (1997). In situations in which U.S. forces are acting as part of a multi-national 
force, the ROEs for that operation may extend unit self-defense to members of foreign forces. See 
SANREMO HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 3.  
 16.  2005 SROE, supra note 11, at A-2.  
 17.  SANREMO HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 3.  
 18.  Stephens, supra note 9, at 131.  
 19.  DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OFFICE OF THE CHIEF NAVAL OPERATIONS AND 
HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND U.S. COAST 
GUARD, COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (NWP-1-14M) 4-6 (2007) 
[hereinafter COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK]. 
 20.  Grunawalt, supra note 15, at 253. 
 21.  SANREMO HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 4 (emphasis in original) ; 2005 SROE, supra note 11, 
at A-4 (“Self-defense includes the authority to pursue and engage forces that have committed a hostile 
act or demonstrated hostile intent, if those forces continue to commit hostile acts or demonstrate hostile 
intent.”).    
 22.  See 2005 SROE supra note 11, at A-3 (stating that unit self-defense must comply with the 
principles of necessity and proportionality); see also SANREMO HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 4 (“The 
use of force must be proportional, which means that the nature, duration, and scope of force used should 
not exceed what is required.”); see also Grunawalt, supra note 15, at 252 (“The responsive action must 
be reasonable in intensity, duration and magnitude based upon all of the facts known to that commander 
at that time.”).  
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employed.”23 If the situation permits, potentially hostile forces should be 
warned and given the opportunity to withdraw before deadly force is 
employed.24 
Consider how unit self-defense might apply in the following 
hypothetical scenarios. In the first, Troy has a small Air Force base located 
in Atlantis, even though the countries have a tense relationship at times. 
One day, a mob of Atlantean citizens gathers around the main gate to the 
base and hurls rotten fruit and stones inside the base’s perimeter. As 
tensions grow, a few unruly Atlanteans launch Molotov cocktails at the 
base guards, injuring several of them. The base commander calls for the 
Atlantis police to break up the mob, but they are slow to respond. As the 
violence escalates, Trojan guards fire tear gas into the crowd and detain 
individuals caught holding cans of gasoline. 
In the second scenario, Macedonia has requested the assistance of 
Sparta to help defend itself against armed groups operating in Macedonian 
territory. Macedonia and Sparta sign a treaty stating that all of Sparta’s 
military operations will be coordinated with Macedonian authorities, except 
in cases of self-defense. On several occasions, armed groups attack Spartan 
patrols. Sparta has intelligence that the leaders of these attacks are meeting 
in an abandoned warehouse. Spartan authorities are in a position to destroy 
the building but do not have time to coordinate the mission with 
Macedonia’s authorities. 
In the first example, it is clear that the Troy military guards would 
have the right to use force to defend themselves against the aggressive acts 
committed by Atlantean civilians. Throwing Molotov cocktails constitutes 
a clear “hostile act,” triggering the right of unit self-defense. This right 
would in some circumstances include the authority to temporarily detain 
the attackers, pending their transfer to Trojan law enforcement 
authorities.25 The second example is more complicated. Although the 
 
 23.  See, e.g., COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 4.  
 24.  See SANREMO HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 3; see also HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE 
ARMY, FM 100-23, PEACE OPERATIONS 17 (1994) [hereinafter FIELD MANUAL] (“[T]he use of force 
should be a last resort and, whenever possible, should be used when other means of persuasion are 
exhausted.”).  
 25.  See Ben F. Klappe, International Peace Operations, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 635, 663 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2008) (stating that in peacetime, detention measures 
are the exclusive domain of law enforcement officials, although “the same measures may be applied by 
peacekeepers in situations where law enforcement agencies of the host country are unable to take 
appropriate action or when individuals are about to commit hostile acts or have shown hostile intent 
against peacekeepers”); see also INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, 
OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 97 (2009). (The Handbook reprints the ROE Card issued to U.S. forces 
operating as part of the peacekeeping mission (KFOR) in Albania. The card states that “[s]oldiers may 
search, disarm, and detain persons as required to protect the force. Detainees will be turned over to 
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Spartan forces have intelligence that the perpetrators of prior attacks are 
located in a warehouse, there is no indication that these terrorists are 
preparing an imminent attack against Spartan units. Accordingly, Spartan 
forces could not likely rely on the self-defense exception to the treaty 
requirement that all military actions be coordinated with the Macedonian 
authorities. 
II. UNIT SELF-DEFENSE: A SUBSET OF NATIONAL SELF-
DEFENSE? 
The right of unit self-defense is widely asserted by militaries around 
the world, yet its source has been examined only cursorily. The most 
common argument in academic literature is that unit self-defense is derived 
from the inherent right of national self-defense recognized by Article 51 of 
the U.N. Charter.26  This Part examines those arguments and ultimately 
finds them unpersuasive. 
A. Arguments that Unit Self-Defense is a Subset of National Self-Defense 
Yoram Dinstein, a preeminent scholar on the law of war, argues that 
unit self-defense—which he refers to as “on the spot reaction”—is a subset 
of national self-defense.27 He states that “[t]here is a quantitative but no 
qualitative difference between a single unit responding to an armed attack 
and the entire military structure doing so.”28 According to Dinstein, self-
defense is always exercised by the state; the actions of the lowest-ranking 
soldier and the highest-ranking general are attributed to the state that put 
them in charge. He concludes: “Once counter-force of whatever scale is 
employed by military units of whatever size—in response to an armed 
attack by another State—that is a manifestation of national self-defence, 
and the legitimacy of the action is determined by Article 51 as well as by 
customary international law.”29 
Hans Hosang similarly argues that the “right to unit self-defence is 
primarily derived from the right of national self-defence.”30 He explains 
that “military units [are] representatives of the sovereign State to which 
they belong” and thus share the “sovereign rights enjoyed by the State.”31 
 
appropriate host nation authorities ASAP.”) The same logic would arguably apply to the military forces 
operating in the territory of another country in a non-peacekeeping capacity.  
 26.  See U.N. Charter art. 51.  
 27.  YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 220 (2005).  
 28.  Id.  
 29.  Id.  
 30.  Hosang, supra note 10, at 420.  
 31.  Id. at 422. 
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Although Hosang acknowledges some important differences between 
national and unit self-defense, he argues that these differences can be 
“addressed by viewing unit self-defence as a tactical level right, whereas 
the right of national self-defence is a strategic level right.”32 Other 
commentators have similarly stated that “[t]he most relevant and applicable 
view of [unit] self-defense in international law resides in Article 51 of the 
U.N. Charter.”33 
B. Criticisms of the National Self-Defense Theory 
There has been little critical analysis of the theory that unit self-
defense is a manifestation of the right of national self-defense. The lack of 
analysis is surprising given the implications that such a theory would have 
for states, including the obligation to report actions taken in national self-
defense to the Security Council and for how states characterize unit self-
defense in treaty practice. This Section examines the weaknesses in the 
national self-defense theory and argues that it is unsustainable. 
First, it is inconsistent with what many states say and do. The 2000 
SROE, for example, state: “The exercise of the right and obligation of 
national self defense by competent authority is separate from and in no way 
limits the commander’s right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense.”34 
The San Remo Handbook on Rules of Engagement, which was drafted by 
experts from several military powers, also recognizes the distinction 
between unit and national self-defense.35 The Israeli Turkel Commission 
similarly endorsed this distinction, stating that “[f]rom a doctrinal 
perspective, the right [of self-defense] is often divided into individual, unit, 
and national self-defense.”36 
Second, it blurs the legal personality of the nation and the individual 
(or unit of individuals). The U.N. Charter regulates inter-state conduct and 
does not speak to individuals’ right to defend themselves (as opposed to 
 
 32.  Id. at 422. 
 33.  Major David Bolgiano et al., Defining the Right of Self-Defense: Working Toward the Use of 
a Deadly Force Appendix to the Standing Rules of Engagement for the Department of Defense, 41 U. 
BALT. L. REV. 157, 163 (2002); see also Lieutenant Colonel W.A. Stafford, How to Keep Military 
Personnel from Going to Jail for Doing the Right Thing: Jurisdiction, ROE & the Rules of Deadly 
Force, THE ARMY LAWYER 1, 5 (2000) (“The concept of self-defense in the Standing ROE . . . stems 
from a state’s right of self-preservation.”).  
 34.  2000 SROE, supra note 11, at A-5. 
 35.  SANREMO HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 3.  
 36.  The Turkel Commission, The Public Comm’n to Examine the Maritime Incident of 30 May 
2010, Rep., 245 (2010) (footnotes omitted). By acknowledging these separate categories, the 
Commission suggested, but did not explicitly state, that the right of unit self-defense and national self-
defense are derived from different legal authorities.  
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their nation) against an attack or imminent attack.37 The Rome Statute, 
which established the International Criminal Court, makes this distinction 
clear. Article 31(1) states that a person shall not be held criminally liable 
for conduct if “[t]he person acts reasonably to defend himself or herself or 
another person . . . against an imminent and unlawful use of force in a 
manner proportionate to the degree of danger to the person or the other 
person or property protected.”38 The second sentence in Article 31(1)(c) 
recognizes the dual nature of self-defense. It states: “The fact that the 
person was involved in a defensive operation conducted by forces shall not 
in itself constitute a ground for excluding criminal responsibility under this 
subparagraph.”39 In other words, the fact that a soldier uses force under a 
national self-defense theory does not necessarily exclude him from criminal 
liability for acts taken in his “official capacity as agent of a collective 
entity, like a State.”40 Rather, the “exclusion of criminal responsibility . . . 
depends on whether the individual defended himself (merely or also) in his 
(non-official) capacity (‘private self-defence’).”41 Accordingly, the Rome 
Statute suggests that international law recognizes an independent right for 
soldiers to exercise self-defense in their private capacity in response to an 
imminent and unlawful use of force, distinct from the right of national self-
defense that soldiers exercise in their official capacity. 
Third, the decisions to exercise unit and national self-defense are 
made at different levels. National self-defense is a right reserved to the 
sovereign. The decision to exercise this right is generally made “at the 
highest levels of government, involving aspects of foreign policy, national 
security, and possible constitutional requirements.”42 The decision to 
exercise unit self-defense, on the other hand, must be made by the unit 
commander, or in many cases the individual soldiers under attack.43 It 
would be dubious to claim that every single soldier has the ability, much 
less the obligation, to exercise a right reserved to the nation. 
Similarly, understanding unit self-defense as a part of national self-
 
 37.  See Hays Parks, Deadly Force IS Authorized, PROCEEDINGS 32, 35 (Jan. 2001) (“Nothing in 
the history of the Charter suggests it was intended to apply to the actions of individual service personnel 
. . . .”); see also ANTONIO CASSESSE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 223 (2003) (“Plainly this [right 
of individual self-defence] must not be confused with self-defence under public international law. The 
latter relates to conduct by States or State-like entities, whereas the former concerns actions by 
individuals against other individuals.”).  
 38.  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 31(1)(c).  
 39.  Id.  
 40.  Albin Eser, General Principles of Criminal Law, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE: 
OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 863, 879 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2008).  
 41.  Id.  
 42.  Hosang, supra note 10, at 422. 
 43.  See Grunawalt, supra note 15, at 252-53.  
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defense is inconsistent with the view held by many states, including the 
U.S., that unit self-defense is an “inherent” and non-derogable right. 44 As 
stated above, national self-defense is a sovereign right. After suffering an 
armed attack, a nation has the option, but not the duty, to use force in 
response. A state may decide to forego its right of self-defense for myriad 
reasons, including the risk of a costly escalation of hostilities.45 If the 
sovereign is to maintain its discretion to exercise national self-defense, it 
must have the authority to restrict the ability of units to exercise this same 
right on its behalf, even if it decides to delegate this responsibility to field 
commanders in certain circumstances. Many states, however, take the 
position that the “inherent” right of unit self-defense cannot be restricted by 
ROEs.46 The United States’ ROE Handbook for Judge Advocates, for 
example, states: “No rule of engagement may ever limit this inherent right 
and obligation.”47 Indeed, in the United States, commanders have an 
“obligation” to exercise unit self-defense in the event of an attack. Thus, 
two commonly accepted positions—that national self-defense is a right 
reserved to the sovereign and that unit self-defense is an inherent, non-
derogable right—can only be reconciled if unit and national self-defense 
are distinct rights. 
Fourth, the theory that unit self-defense is a subset of national self-
defense fails to account for United Nations peacekeeping operations. As 
discussed further in Part III, peacekeepers operating under U.N. command 
have the same inherent right of self-defense as units operating under 
national command.48 The use of force by U.N. peacekeepers to defend their 
 
 44.  SHERROD LEWIS BUMGARDNER ET AL., NATO, LEGAL DESKBOOK 259 (2d ed. 2010) 
(“Individuals and units have an inherent right to defend themselves against attack or an imminent 
attack, and NATO ROE issued for a mission do not limit this right.”). U.S. military manuals state that 
the “inherent right of self defense, front unit to individual level, applies in all peace operations at all 
times.” FIELD MANUAL, supra note 24, at 17; see also COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 4 
(stating that the right of unit self-defense is an “inherent right”). The Australian military similarly states 
that the commander’s discretion to act in unit self-defense is a “non-derogable right.” Stephens, supra 
note 9, at 144 (citing the Australian Defense Force Publication 3 (1st ed)).  
 45.  For an example of a state’s decision to not use force in response to an armed attack, see 
Associated Press, U.S. Backs South Korea in Punishing North, NBCNEWS, May 24, 2010, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37309788/ns/world_news-asia_pacific/t/us-backs-south-korea-
punishing-north/#.TsxqN2CfuTU (describing non-forceful measures that South Korea took in response 
to a North Korean torpedo attack that sank a South Korean warship and killed forty-six sailors).  
 46.  See Roach, supra note 1, at 865 (stating that “[m]ost every peacetime ROE contains a 
warning to the effect that ‘nothing in these rules is intended to limit the commander’s right of self-
defense’”); FIELD MANUAL, supra note 24, at 90 (“Nothing in these rules negates your inherent right to 
use reasonable force to defend yourself against dangerous personal attack.”).  
 47.  CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) HANDBOOK 
FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES 3-26 (2000).  
 48.  See, e.g., Katherine E. Cox, Beyond Self-Defense: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 
and the Use of Force, 27 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 239, 249 (1999); see also Hosang, supra note 10, 
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units cannot reasonably be considered an exercise of national self-defense, 
as the United Nations is not a state and an attack against U.N. peacekeepers 
cannot under many circumstances be construed as an attack against any 
individual country. 
Fifth, the right of unit self-defense applies equally to hostile acts by 
state and non-state actors. ROEs do not differentiate between threats posed 
by armed forces, non-state armed groups, or individual actors: the right of 
unit self-defense is triggered by a hostile act or hostile intent, regardless of 
the source of the threat. This poses problems for those who argue that unit 
self-defense is a manifestation of national self-defense, as there is 
significant debate as to whether non-state actors can commit “armed 
attacks” as envisioned by Article 51. On the one hand, a number of 
scholars, and many countries, argue that non-state actors can commit armed 
attacks, and that the use of force in response to such an attack is justified if 
the host state is “unwilling or unable to take effective action” to mitigate 
the threat posed by the armed group.49 Under this theory, a military unit 
that responds to an attack by a non-state actor could plausibly claim that its 
use of force was justified, assuming the host government (even if able or 
willing to combat terrorism in general) was not able to mitigate the 
imminent threat posed. On the other hand, the ICJ, ICTY, and numerous 
scholars have taken the position that an attack by an armed group may only 
be considered an “armed attack” under Article 51 if the host state exercises 
“overall control” of the armed group.50 Under this theory, a unit exercising 
 
at 417 (“United Nations forces under United Nations command and control have the right to defend 
themselves against an imminent attack”).  
 49.  See Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for Extra-
Territorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 483, 486 (2012) (“More than a century of state practice 
suggests that it is lawful for State X, which has suffered an armed attack by an insurgent or terrorist 
group, to use force in State Y against that group if State Y is unwilling or unable to suppress the 
threat.”); Theresa Reinold, State Weakness, Irregular Warfare, and the Right to Self-Defense Post-9/11, 
105 AM. J. INT’L L. 244, 251 (2011); John B. Bellinger III, Terrorism and Changes to the Laws of War, 
20 DUKE J. COMP & INT’L L. 331, 335 (2010) (stating that “the United States has a right to use force 
against al Qaeda only in those places where a country is unable or unwilling, to contain the threat itself, 
which really results in just a couple of countries in the world”); Permanent Representative of Turkey to 
the United Nations, Letter dated January 3, 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the 
Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, S/1996/479, January 3, 1997 (stating that 
Turkish actions against the PKK in Iraq were justified due to Iraq’s inability to exercise its authority 
over the northern parts of its territory which facilitated terrorist attacks against Turkey coming from 
Iraqi territory). 
 50.  Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-A (July 15, 1999), 38 ILM 1518 (1999); 
Military and Paramilitary Activities Case, supra note 8, at 65 (setting forth an “effective control” test); 
see also Independent International Fact Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Rep., at 259 (Sept. 
2009), available at http://www.ceiig.ch/Report.html (stating that “North and South Ossetian military 
operations are attributable to Russia if they were sent by Russia and if they were under the effective 
control by Russia”).  
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the right of self-defense against a non-state actor unaffiliated with the host 
state could not argue that Article 51 of the U.N. Charter provided the 
justification for its use of force. Thus, at least for those states that do not 
endorse the theory that non-state actors can commit armed attacks, their 
theory of unit self-defense against such actors must be divorced from 
national self-defense. 
Finally, despite Dinstein’s claim to the contrary, there is a qualitative 
difference between unit self-defense and national self-defense. The right of 
unit self-defense permits soldiers to take action to repel an attack or 
imminent attack. Significantly, the responsive use of force must be 
temporally interwoven with the event triggering it, and directed at the 
source of the threat itself. Unit self-defense would not likely authorize a 
unit to use force days after the hostile act occurred, to attack an entity other 
than that responsible for the attack or threatened attack, or to take action to 
prevent future (but not necessarily imminent) attacks. 
As with unit self-defense, the use of force in national self-defense 
must comply with the principles of necessity, proportionality, and 
immediacy.51 A state has significantly more flexibility, however, in 
exercising its right of national self-defense. The “immediacy” 
requirement52 in national self-defense is less demanding than in unit self-
defense. Following an armed attack, states are not required to act instantly 
and without deliberation.53 To the contrary, international law requires states 
to first determine whether the use of force is necessary, to exhaust 
reasonably available alternatives to the use of force, and to consider the 
appropriate response.54  Accordingly, states invoking their right under 
Article 51 often act weeks, or even months, after the armed attack against 
them. The United States, for example, did not respond militarily to the 
September 11 attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon 
 
 51.  Case Concerning Oil Platforms, (Iran v. U.S.) 2003 I.C.J. 161, 183 (November 6); THE 
HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, supra note 10, at 195-96. 
(“Under customary international law, the requirements of necessity, proportionality, and immediacy are 
well established as complementing the requirements in the Charter in relation to the exercise of self-
defence.”).  
 52.  Although often phrased as a condition of national self-defense, “immediacy” is generally 
understood to mean that the responsive action must be taken “within a reasonable time.” THE 
HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, supra note 10, at 197.  
 53.  The United States’ brief to the ICJ in the Oil Platforms case made this clear. U.S. brief, para. 
4.37 (“Of greater importance, neither the concept of self-defense, nor the concept of necessity, demands 
instant response to an armed attack.”) (“International law does not require that a State choose between 
resorting to armed force instantly and without reflection, or sacrificing its right to take prudent and 
considered defensive action.”).  
 54.  See, e.g., DINSTEIN supra note 27, at 198; William H. Taft IV, Self Defense and the Oil 
Platforms Decision, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 295, 303-04 (2004).  
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until October 7.55 
Moreover, unlike force taken in unit self-defense, many states and 
scholars argue that measures taken in national self-defense are not 
necessarily limited to repelling the armed attack (or imminent attack) that 
triggered the right of self-defense. After suffering an armed attack, a state 
can “also use force in self-defense to remove continuing threats to its 
future security.”56 Accordingly, states can target military objectives that 
may not have been directly responsible for the armed attack, so long as the 
response is proportionate to the armed attack and necessary to prevent 
further attacks.57 
The United States’ response to the 1998 bombings against its 
embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania is illustrative of 
the discretion that nations have in responding to an armed attack. On 
August 20, 1998, U.S. cruise missiles targeted a terrorist training camp in 
Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan.58 In its letter to the 
Security Council, the United States stated that its response was intended to 
“prevent and deter” future terrorist attacks by Osama Bin Laden’s 
organization, al-Qaeda.59 Although the Al-Shifa chemical factory did not 
play a role in the embassy bombings, U.S. officials believed that the factory 
was a legitimate target given evidence suggesting that al-Qaeda was using 
the factory to manufacture chemical weapons that would pose an ongoing 
(but not necessarily imminent) threat to U.S. national security.60 
In sum, the right of unit self-defense is fundamentally different from 
national self-defense in several key aspects, including the level of authority 
at which the decision to use force may be made and the nature and scope of 
the force that may be employed in response to an attack. These key 
differences between the rights of unit and national self-defense suggest that 
 
 55.  UN Doc. S/2001/947 (October 7, 2011) (emphasis added). 
 56.  United States Brief, Oil Platforms Case, para. 4.27; see Taft, supra note 54, at 305 (stating 
that proportionality requires an assessment of “what force could reasonably be judged to be needed to 
successfully deter future attacks”) (emphasis added).  
 57.  As Dinstein acknowledges, “The choice of the time and place for putting into operation 
defensive armed reprisals, like that of the objective against which they are directed, is made by the 
victim state.” DINSTEIN, supra note 27, at 222; see also OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 154 (1991) (“It does not seem unreasonable as a rule to allow a State to 
retaliate beyond the immediate area of the attack when that State has sufficient reason to expect 
continuation of attacks (with substantial military weapons) from the same source.”).  
 58.  TOM RUYS, “ARMED ATTACK” AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER: CUSTOMARY LAW 
AND PRACTICE 152 (citing UN Doc. S/1998/780, 20 August 1998).  
 59.  UN Doc. S/1998/780.  
 60.  Id.; see also Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against Bin Laden, 24 
YALE J. INT’L L. 559 (1999); Al-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 559 F.3d 578, 581 (D.C. Cir. 
2009).  
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the right of unit self-defense is not derived from Article 51 of the U.N. 
Charter. Accordingly, the basis for unit self-defense under international 
law, if it exists, must be found elsewhere. 
III. UNIT SELF-DEFENSE IN CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
This Part argues that customary international law recognizes a right of 
unit self-defense separate from the right of national self-defense. 
Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice 
of states acting under a sense of legal obligation, or opinio juris.61 As 
explained below, state practice—as evident in military manuals and ROEs, 
bilateral treaties, U.N. practice, and the writing of scholars—supports the 
argument that the right of unit self-defense is reflected in customary 
international law.62 These sources also indicate opinio juris, or states’ 
belief, that unit self-defense is an inherent right that they are obliged to 
respect rather than a policy preference. This state practice also indicates 
that states do not understand unit self-defense to be a manifestation of 
national self-defense. 
A. Rules of Engagement 
Rules of Engagement can serve as a useful indicator of customary 
international law as they are premised upon states’ understanding of their 
international legal obligations.63 The NATO SROE and the San Remo 
Handbook both state that “[i]t is universally recognised that individuals and 
units have a right to defend themselves against attack or imminent 
attack.”64 U.S. military manuals similarly assert that the “inherent right of 
 
 61.  Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102(2) (1987).  
 62.  See Stephens, supra note 9, at 130 (stating that unit self-defense is “a right sui generis which 
exists independently under customary international law”). 
 63.  See Guy Phillips, Rules of Engagement: A Primer, THE ARMY LAWYER 4, 9 (1993); Steven 
R. Ratner, The Gulf of Sidra Incident of 1981: A Study of the Lawfulness of Peacetime Aerial 
Engagements, 10 YALE. J. INT’L L. 59, 61 (1984). One commentator states that Rules of Engagement 
are “somewhat self-evident expressions of State opinio juris.” Stephens, supra note 9, at 130. An 
exhaustive review of states’ ROEs is not possible due to their classified nature.   
 64.  NATO MC 362/1, NATO Rules of Engagement (quoted in John J. Merriam, Natural Law and 
Self-Defense, 206 MILITARY L. REV. 43, 78 (2010)); SAN REMO HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 4. The 
San Remo Handbook, published by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law and drafted by 
members of the U.S., Canadian, Australian, and United Kingdom militaries, can be considered 
representative of various nations’ ROEs. It was presented and critiqued “at many varied venues, 
including two multinational ROE workshops and two naval operations courses held at IIHL. After three 
years of drafting and testing, the IIHL Council approved publication of the Handbook in September of 
2009.” Id. at Preface. The Turkel Commission, which was established by the Israeli government to 
review the legality of the Israeli Defense Forces’ actions to enforce the blockade of the Gaza Strip on 
May 31, 2010, endorsed the San Remo Handbook in its report, stating that it “provides a helpful 
overview of how the law regarding the use of force in self-defense, defense of others, and mission 
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self defense, from unit to individual level, applies in all peace operations at 
all times.”65 Another commentator observes, “The right for individual 
soldiers to use force in self-defence, including action in anticipation of an 
imminent attack, seems to be generally accepted.”66 
As discussed in greater detail infra, United Nations Peacekeeping 
ROEs also acknowledge a right akin to unit self-defense. Peacekeepers are 
generally not combatants, and thus are not privileged under the laws of war 
to participate in hostilities.67 The ROE for the United Nations Mission in 
Liberia (UNMIL), for example, authorized the use of force “to defend 
oneself, other U.N. personnel, or other international personnel against a 
hostile act or a hostile intent.”68 Peacekeepers operating as part of the 
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) were authorized to 
exercise the “inherent right of self-defence.”69 Similarly, the U.N. ROE for 
the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) authorized 
peacekeepers to use deadly force in self-defense, which it defined as 
“action to protect oneself or one’s unit against a hostile act or hostile 
intent.”70 
States’ characterizations of the nature of unit self-defense are also 
indicative of opinio juris.71 By characterizing unit self-defense as a “right” 
and/or “obligation,” many states make clear their understanding that unit 
self-defense is grounded in law rather than in the policy preferences of 
individual nations. States do not view their ROEs as authorizing unit self-
defense, which they could presumably do if unit self-defense was merely a 
subset of national self-defense. Rather, self-defense is a right that cannot be 
limited by ROEs72 or even other international legal obligations.73 
 
accomplishment is generally interpreted and communicated to military personnel.” The Public 
Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 2010, The Turkel Commission 245, 
http://www.turkel-committee.com/files/wordocs/8808report-eng.pdf.  
 65.  FIELD MANUAL, supra note 24, at 17.  
 66.  See DIETER FLECK, THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF VISITING FORCES 546 (2001); NATO 
LEGAL DESKBOOK 259 (2d ed. 2010) (“Individuals and units have an inherent right to defend 
themselves against attack or an imminent attack, and NATO ROE issued for a mission do not limit this 
right.”).  
 67.  Peacekeepers can lose their protection from attack if they directly participate in hostilities.  
 68.  U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated 29 September 2003 from the Secretary-General 
addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/926 (Sep. 29, 2003). 
 69.  United Nations Peace Operations Year in Review 2006, UN helps Lebanon recover, as 
Europe returns to peacekeeping, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/yir/2006/lebanon.htm  
 70.  TREVOR FINDLAY, THE USE OF FORCE IN UN PEACE OPERATIONS, Appendix 2. Rules of 
Engagement (Oxford Press 2002) (reprinting the rules of engagement for UNOSOM II, May 1993).  
 71.  One commentator states that Rules of Engagement are “somewhat self-evident expressions of 
State opinio juris.” Stephens, supra note 9, at 130. 
 72.  Id.; see also Roach, supra note 1 (stating that “[m]ost every peacetime ROE contains a 
warning to the effect that ‘nothing in these rules is intended to limit the commander’s right of self-
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B. Treaties 
The right of unit self-defense is reflected in a number of bilateral and 
multilateral treaties. In the treaties cited below, it appears that parties are 
referring to unit self-defense rather than national self-defense. 
Significantly, the treaties mention the inherent right of self-defense of the 
“officials,” “security forces,” the “American force,” and the “United States 
forces” rather than the “United States” or the “parties.” The description of 
the right of self-defense as “inherent” is also evidence of opinio juris. 
1. Narcotics Interdiction Treaties 
References to the right of self-defense are most common in bilateral 
narcotics interdiction treaties. The Agreement between the Government of 
the United States and the Government of the Republic of Nicaragua 
concerning Cooperation to Suppress Illicit Traffic by Sea and Air, for 
example, sets forth the terms between Nicaragua and the United States for 
implementing several multilateral conventions on suppression of drug-
trafficking.74 Article 15 states that “[a]ll uses of force by a Party pursuant to 
this Agreement shall be in strict accordance with applicable laws and 
policies of that Party and shall in all cases be the minimum reasonably 
necessary under the circumstances.”75 The treaty reaffirms, however, that 
“[n]othing in this Agreement shall impair the exercise of the inherent right 
of self defense by law enforcement or other officials of the Parties.”76 
2. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Treaties 
In 2003, President Bush convened a number of like-minded States to 
participate in a Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to counter the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).77  As a result of this 
initiative, the United States entered into a number of treaties with these 
like-minded countries, authorizing the parties to take various steps, 
 
defense.’”); Grunawalt, supra note 15, at 252.  
 73.  2005 SROE, supra note 11, at A-2 (“International agreements (e.g., status-of-forces 
agreements) may never be interpreted to limit U.S. forces’ right of self-defense.”); Lieutenant Colonel 
Mark S. Martins, Deadly Force Is Authorized, but Also Trained, THE ARMY LAWYER 1, 4 (2001) 
(“[T]he SROE is replete with caveats that make clear that no international obligation may be interpreted 
to infringe upon individual self-defense.”).  
 74.  The Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of the 
Republic of Nicaragua concerning Cooperation to Suppress Illicit Traffic by Sea and Air, U.S.-Nicar., 
Jun.1, 2001, 2001 U.S.T. LEXIS 63 (entered into force Nov. 15, 2001). 
 75.  Id. art. 15.  
 76.  Id. art. 15-16. Although the treaty refers to “law enforcement officials,” the U.S. Coast Guard, 
a branch of the U.S. military, is primarily responsible for narcotic interdiction efforts at sea.  
 77.  James C. Kraska, Averting Nuclear Terrorism: Building a Global Regime of Cooperative 
Threat Reduction, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 703, 718-19 (2005).  
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including boarding their respective flagged vessels at sea or in port, in 
support of interdiction efforts to prevent the shipment of WMDs, their 
delivery systems and related materials.78 These treaties contain language 
regarding security forces’ “inherent right” to use force in self-defense. The 
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and 
the Government of the Republic of Cyprus Concerning Cooperation to 
Suppress the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Their Delivery 
Systems and Related Materials by Sea (entered into force January 12, 
2006), provides a good example. Article 9(4) of the agreement states: 
“Boarding and search teams and Security Force vessels have the inherent 
right to use all available means to apply that force reasonably necessary to 
defend themselves or others from physical harm.”79 Several other ship 
boarding treaties, including those between the United States and Liberia, 
and the United States and the Marshall Islands contain identical 
provisions.80 Even in the absence of a treaty, the authority to use force to 
intercept, board, and search such vessels may be derived from the boarding 
state’s right under customary international law, a U.N. Security Council 
authorization, the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 
or, in some circumstances, “the unit’s or individual’s right of self 
defense.”81 
3. Basing Agreements 
A number of basing agreements also refer, at least implicitly, to the 
right of unit self-defense. In 1982, Lebanon and the United States 
effectuated an agreement authorizing the deployment of 1,200 U.S. troops 
to serve with the Multi-National Force in the Beirut area.82 The treaty 
 
 78.  Sandra L. Hodgkinson et al., Challenges to Maritime Interception Operations in the War on 
Terror: Bridging the Gap, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 583, 660-61 (2007) (noting that the United States 
had concluded six ship-boarding agreements).  
 79.  Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
the Republic of Cyprus Concerning Cooperation to Suppress the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, U.S.-Cyprus, art. 9(4), Jul. 25, 2005, 2005 U.S.T. LEXIS 188.  
 80.  Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
the Republic of Liberia Concerning Cooperation to Suppress the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, Their Delivery Systems, and Related Materials by Sea, U.S.-Liber., art. 9, Feb. 11, 2004; 
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 
Republic of the Marshall Islands Concerning Cooperation to Suppress the Proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, Their Delivery Systems, and Related Materials by Sea, U.S.-Marsh.Is., art. 9, Aug. 
13, 2004.  
 81.  Craig Allen, Limits on the Use of Force in Maritime Operations, 35 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 115, 124 (2005).  
 82.  This agreement was effected by an exchange of diplomatic notes between the Lebanese 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and the United States Ambassador to Lebanon 
on September 25, 1982. It entered into force on the same day. See 34 U.S.T. 2608.  
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provided, “In carrying out its mission, the American Force will not engage 
in combat. It may, however, exercise the right of self-defense.”83 Similarly, 
the Agreement Regarding the Military Use and Operating Rights of the 
Government of the United States in the Republic of the Marshall Islands 
states: 
 
External security for the defense sites will be conducted by the 
Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands in close 
coordination with U.S. forces. If the Government of the Marshall Islands 
cannot provide adequate external defense of the defense sites, United 
States forces will be permitted to exercise their inherent right of self-
defense.84 
 
4. United Nations Convention on the Safety of United Nations and 
Associated Personnel 
The United Nations Convention on the Safety of United Nations and 
Associated Personnel also reflects states’ shared view of the right of unit 
self-defense.85 The Convention was adopted by the General Assembly in 
1994 and was intended to create a legal regime for the prosecution or 
extradition of persons accused of attacking U.N. personnel who were not 
engaged as combatants in armed conflict.86 Significantly, the Convention 
contains a savings clause in Article 21, which states: “Nothing in this 
convention shall be construed so as to derogate from the right to act in self 
defense.” A few delegations resisted the inclusion of this provision on the 
grounds that the right of self-defense was self-evident, making this 
provision redundant.87 A member of the U.S. negotiating team later wrote 
that the “United States delegation accepted this clause because it does not 
 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  The Agreement Regarding the Military Use and Operating Rights of the Government of the 
United States in the Republic of the Marshall Islands Concluded Pursuant to Sections 321 and 323 of 
the Compact of Free Association, as Amended, U.S.-Marsh.Is., 2003 U.S.T. LEXIS 194 (entered into 
force March 23, 2004); see also The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force of Japan: The Exchange of 
Military Personnel, 2010 U.S.T. Lexis 8 (2010), Art. 6.12 (stating that the “Military Exchange 
Personnel assigned to the unit shall not actively participate in the hostilities . . . [but that] [t]his 
requirement shall not be read to restrict Military Exchange Personnel’s right to act in self-defense.”).  
 85.  U.N. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, Dec. 9, 1994, 34 
I.L.M. 482, adopted by consensus in General Assembly Resolution 49/59 (December 9, 1994). The 
Convention was drafted and negotiated after states recognized a number of legal inadequacies in their 
ability to prosecute an increasing number of attacks committed against peacekeeping personnel.  
 86.  The Convention does not apply to situations covered by common article 2 of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions. See id. art. 2(2).  
 87.  Evan Bloom, Protecting Peacekeepers: The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and 
Associated Personnel, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 621, 630 (1995).  
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in any event alter the basic legal framework, which establishes the right to 
self defense under customary international law, the U.N. Charter, and 
relevant resolutions of the Security Council.”88 The Secretary of State’s 
letter submitting the treaty to the President makes this point clear. It states, 
“This Article [21] reflects a basic tenet of international law: that forces may 
defend themselves when attacked or threatened by imminent attack.”89 
Significantly, the Secretary of State refers to the right of self-defense by 
“forces” rather than “nations,” indicating that the peacekeepers’ right to 
defend themselves is distinct from the right of national self-defense 
reflected in Article 51. 
C. United Nations Practice 
U.N. resolutions, statements, and practice also indicate a widely 
shared understanding of the right to unit self-defense. Security Council 
Resolution 1088, for example, established a multinational stabilization 
force (SFOR) to help implement and enforce the Peace Agreement in 
Bosnia Herzegovina following the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia.90 
Among other things, the resolution “[a]uthorize[d] Member States to take 
all necessary measures, at the request of SFOR, either in defence of SFOR 
or to assist the force in carrying out its mission, and recognize[d] the right 
of the force to take all necessary measures to defend itself from attack or 
threat of attack.”91 The fact that the Security Council “recognized” rather 
than “authorized” the right of unit self-defense, indicates its belief that this 
right exists independent of the authorities bestowed to the SFOR by the 
Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. 
The U.N. has also taken the position that its peacekeepers have a right 
of self-defense, independent from the right of national self-defense. U.N. 
peacekeeping operations (unlike enforcement actions taken under Chapter 
VII) are based on the consent of the concerned states. U.N. peacekeepers 
are not combatants and thus do not have the authority to engage in 
hostilities.92 Nevertheless, “the right of U.N. peacekeeping operations to 
exercise force in self-defense . . . may be thought of as an ‘inherent right’ 
of the peacekeepers” and has been “consistently provided for in the rules of 
 
 88.  Id.; see also M. Bourlogannis-Vrailas, The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and 
Associated Personnel, 44 INT’L COMP. L.Q. 560 (1995).  
 89.  Letter of Submittal, from Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to President Clinton (Nov. 8, 
2000).  
 90.  S.C. Res. 1088, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1088 (Dec. 12, 1996).  
 91.  Id. ¶ 20. 
 92.  Katherine E. Cox, Beyond Self-Defense: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and the 
Use of Force, 27 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 239, 246 (1999) ( “[T]he use of force by UN peacekeeping 
forces has been limited to that used in self-defense.”). 
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engagement established for each peacekeeping operation since their 
inception.”93 
The right of self-defense for U.N. peacekeepers closely mirrors (and 
in some cases exceeds) the right of unit self-defense in national ROEs.94 In 
1964, for example, the U.N. Secretary General reaffirmed that the use of 
force by troops in the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus 
(UNFICYP) was “permissible only in self-defence,” which includes: “(a) 
the defence of United Nations posts, premises and vehicles under armed 
attack; [and] (b) the support of other personnel of UNFICYP under armed 
attack.”95 The Secretary General added that, as with unit self-defense, 
“[t]he decision as to when force may be used under these circumstances 
rests with the commander on the spot.”96 
The U.N. has actually broadened its definition of self-defense over the 
past few decades. As one commentator explains, the U.N. realized that a 
broader definition of self-defense “would make peacekeeping operations 
more viable and would enable the United Nations to effectively carry out 
peacekeeping mandates without the need to resort to ‘enforcement 
measures.’”97 Accordingly, in more recent peacekeeping missions, the U.N. 
“interpreted this right of self-defense very broadly, so as to justify not only 
the use of force to protect United Nations and associated personnel and 
property from attacks, but also to justify the use of force in response to 
armed resistance to the discharge of the force’s mandate.”98 
In sum, state practice and indications of opinio juris strongly support 
the position that there is a right of unit self-defense under international law. 
This right, which extends to all military units, cannot be restricted by Rules 
of Engagement or even by bilateral treaties.99 For the reasons stated in Part 
II, the right of unit self-defense should not be confused with the right of 
national self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. 
 
 93.   Id. at 249 (1999); see also Hosang, supra note 10, at 417 (“United Nations forces under 
United Nations command and control have the right to defend themselves against an imminent attack”).  
 94.  See D.W. BOWETT, UNITED NATIONS FORCES 196-205 (1964) for a description of the right of 
self-defense during the peacekeeping operation in the Congo. 
 95.   U.N. Secretary-General, note dated Apr. 11, 1964 addressed to the General Assembly, at 4, 
U.N. Doc. S/5653 (Apr. 11, 1964).  
 96.  Id. at 2, 4.  
 97.  Cox, supra note 92, at 249. 
 98.  Christopher Greenwood, Protection of Peacekeepers: The Legal Regime, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 185, 198 (1996). 
 99.  See Martins, supra note 73, at 4; see also Roach, supra note 1, at 870 (“Most every peacetime 
ROE contains a warning to the effect that ‘nothing in these rules is intended to limit the commander’s 
right of self-defense.’”); Grunawalt, supra note 15, at 252.  
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IV. UNIT SELF-DEFENSE AND THE ICJ 
Parts II and III argued that the rights of unit and national self-defense 
are distinct rights under international law. This Part argues that maintaining 
this distinction can help resolve some inconsistencies in the ICJ opinion in 
the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua case. 
Specifically, understanding unit self-defense as an independent right allows 
us to acknowledge that the use of force might be justified in response to the 
ICJ’s category of “frontier incidents” that do not arise to the level of an 
armed attack under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, without abandoning 
strict adherence to the fundamental prohibition on the use of force set forth 
in Article 2(4) of the Charter. 
A. Overview of the Case 
The dispute underlying the Military and Paramilitary Activities case 
centered on a series of events following the demise of the Somoza 
Government in Nicaragua in 1979 and the establishment of the Frente 
Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FLSN).100 The United States initially 
supported the new Nicaraguan government, but the relationship soon 
soured as the Sandinista regime curtailed human rights and instituted 
socialist reforms.101 The FLSN also significantly expanded the size of its 
military and provided logistical support, including the provision of arms, to 
guerrillas in El Salvador and other countries in Latin America.102 The 
United States in turn cut off aid to Nicaragua and started to provide covert 
support for the armed resistance, the Contras, in Nicaragua.103 
On April 9, 1984, Nicaragua initiated proceedings against the United 
States at the ICJ. Nicaragua alleged that U.S. actions, including its support 
for the Contras, constituted a violation of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, 
as well as the customary law obligation to refrain from the threat or use of 
force.104 The United States argued during the jurisdiction stage105 that 
 
 100.  See generally Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 8. For an in-depth overview of 
the events leading up to the ICJ case, see John Norton Moore, The Secret War in Central America and 
the Future of the World Order, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 43 (1986).  
 101.    Moore, supra note 100, at 45 (“[T]he commandants curtailed civil and political rights, 
denied free elections, initiated massive militarization of society and, in general, began to move sharply 
toward Cuban-style totalitarianism.”).  
 102.   See id. at 48 (stating that the Sandinistas were “beginning a massive military buildup and 
joining with the Cubans in launching an intense secret guerrilla war against El Salvador and Guatemala 
and an armed subversion against Costa Rica and Honduras”).  
 103.  Id. at 69, 72.  
 104.  Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 8, ¶ 15.  
 105.  The United States did not appear at the merits stage due to the ICJ’s decision to adjudicate the 
case on the merits notwithstanding the United States’ multilateral treaty reservation to the ICJ’s 
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Nicaragua’s support and supply of arms to armed groups operating in 
neighboring countries, primarily El Salvador, constituted an “armed 
attack,” and that its own actions were justified under the right to collective 
self-defense.106 The United States also alleged that Nicaragua had made 
armed incursions into both Honduras and Costa Rica, and that these 
incursions similarly constituted armed attacks that triggered the right of 
collective self-defense.107 
In addressing the U.S. claim that Nicaragua had committed an armed 
attack against El Salvador that triggered the right of collective self-defense, 
the Court noted that not all uses of force amount to an armed attack.108 The 
Court explained that it is “necessary to distinguish the most grave forms of 
the use of force (those constituting an armed attack) from other less grave 
forms.”109 The Court further stated that certain operations “because of 
[their] scale and effects” may be classified as an “armed attack” rather than 
a mere “frontier incident.”110 It then concluded that the concept of armed 
attack does not include “assistance to rebels in the form of the provision of 
weapons or logistical or other support.”111 Nevertheless, the Court found 
that “[s]uch assistance may be regarded as a threat or use of force,” which 
is prohibited by the U.N. Charter and customary international law.112 
Accordingly, El Salvador, as the victim of the unlawful use of force, would 
have been permitted to take certain counter-measures, possibly including 
the use of force.113 The United States, however, could not invoke the 
principle of collective self-defense in the absence of an armed attack.114 
The Court also rejected the claim that Nicaragua had committed 
 
jurisdiction. The so-called “Vandenberg reservation” excludes from the Court’s jurisdiction “disputes 
arising under a multilateral treaty, unless (1) all parties to the treaty affected by the decision are also 
parties to the case before the Court, or (2) the United States specially agrees to jurisdiction.”  
 106.  Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 8, ¶¶ 126-30.  
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. ¶ 191.  
 109.  Id.  
 110.  Id. ¶ 195.  
 111.  Id.  
 112.   See id. ¶¶ 195-96.  
 113.  The Court suggested, but did not affirmatively state, that a victim state’s counter measures 
may include the use of force in response to an unlawful use of force short of an armed attack. John 
Hargrove, The Nicaragua Judgment and the Future of the Law of Force and Self Defense, 81 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 135, 136-37 (1987); see also DINSTEIN, supra note 27, at 194 (“Unfortunately, the Court 
carefully refrained from ruling out the possibility that such counter-measures may involve the use of 
force by the victim state.”); Dale G. Stephens, The Impact of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention on the 
Conduct of Peacetime Naval/Military Operations, 29 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 283, 298 (1999) (stating that 
although the “court did not expressly admit that such ‘proportionate countermeasures’ could themselves 
include an element of force . . . the better view is that this is what was intended”). 
 114.  Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 8, ¶ 229.  
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armed attacks against Honduras and Costa Rica, even though it considered 
“as established the fact that certain transborder military incursions into the 
territory of Honduras and Costa Rica [were] imputable to the Government 
of Nicaragua.”115 Despite a statement from the representative of Honduras 
to the contrary, and without further explanation, the Court concluded: 
“these incursions . . . may [not] be relied on as justifying the exercise of the 
right of collective self-defence.”116 
B. Criticisms of the ICJ Decision 
A number of scholars have sharply criticized the ICJ’s opinion, and 
especially its narrow view of the meaning of armed attack.117 Much of the 
criticism focuses on the Court’s distinction between uses of force that 
amount to an “armed attack” and those that are better characterized as mere 
“frontier incidents.” Dinstein called the Court’s opinion “baffling” and 
stated that the Court’s new category of “frontier incidents” as “particularly 
bothersome.”118 Hargrove called the opinion “not merely unwarranted as a 
matter of law, but . . . deeply unwise.”119 
The primary concerns with the Court’s opinion are two-fold. First, it 
creates significant uncertainty as to the meaning of “armed attack” by 
introducing criteria (i.e., scale and effect) that are arguably not based in 
customary international law.120 As William Taft, former Legal Adviser to 
the State Department, observed, “the gravity of an attack may affect the 
proper scope of the defensive use of force . . . , but it is not relevant to 
determining whether there is a right of self defense in the first instance.”121 
Under the Court’s opinion, for example, it is unclear whether a few mortars 
fired across an international border would have the requisite “scale and 
effect” to constitute an armed attack, triggering the right to self-defense. 
Second, according to many commentators, the Court’s opinion creates 
 
 115.  See id. ¶ 164.  
 116.  Id. ¶¶ 231, 234. The only detail that the Court offered in reaching this conclusion was the fact 
that Honduras had not reported to the Security Council that it had requested the assistance of the United 
States in defending Nicaragua’s incursions, although it did inform the Council that Nicaragua had 
engaged in aggression against it. 
 117.  See, e.g., Theresa Reinold, State Weakness, Irregular Warfare, and the Right to Self-Defense 
Post-9/11, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 244, 245 (2011) (stating that the “conservative pronouncements of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) on self-defense have further muddied already murky waters”); 
Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of War: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 539, 541 (2002).  
 118.  DINSTEIN, supra note 27, at 195. 
 119.  Hargove, supra note 113, at 140.  
 120.  Id. at 139 (stating that the Court’s distinction is “unsupported by the language of the Charter 
 . . . which in no way limits itself to especially large, direct or important armed attacks”).  
 121.  Taft, supra note 54, at 300. 
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“an open-ended and wholly new category of exception to Article 2(4) of 
the [U.N.] Charter, of unknown content and limit.”122 Article 2(4) 
establishes the baseline rule that states “shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations.”123 The one exception to this rule 
is in Article 51, which states that “[n]othing in the present Charter shall 
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed 
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.”124 These two 
provisions establish a bright line rule that “only an armed attack—and 
nothing short of an armed attack—can precipitate a forcible reaction by 
way of self-defence.”125 The Court’s opinion casts significant doubt on this 
bright line rule by suggesting that forceful countermeasures may be taken 
in situations where no armed attack has occurred.126 This position is 
difficult to reconcile with the text of the U.N. Charter. 
The Court’s ruling was likely motivated by a desire to limit the 
involvement of third states, and thus the likelihood for escalation, in what 
might otherwise be minor disputes between two states.127 According to 
some commentators, however, by creating a new category of lawful use of 
force (i.e., forceful countermeasures), the Court relaxed the bar on the use 
of force and may have actually encouraged low-intensity conflicts.128 
C. Unit Self-Defense and Frontier Incidents 
The primary concerns with the Court’s opinion may be at least 
partially mitigated if we recognize the distinction between unit and national 
self-defense. There is some intuitive appeal to the Court’s desire to 
conclude that an “armed attack” must entail some threshold level of force. 
Self-defense is a concept that “lends itself to abuse,”129 as victim states are 
unlikely to have a dispassionate view as to the necessity or proportionality 
 
 122.  Hargove, supra note 113, at 142.  
 123.  UN Charter, art. 2, para. 4.  
 124.  Id. art. 51.  
 125.  DINSTEIN, supra note 27, at 194.  
 126.  See Tom J. Farer, Drawing the Right Line, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 112, 113 (1987) (interpreting 
the Court’s opinion to mean that the victim of illegal use of force that does not amount to an armed 
attack “may retaliate by means short of an armed attack and which in addition comply with the tests of 
necessity and proportionality”).  
 127.  CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 133 (2000); see also Farer, 
supra note 126, at 114 (stating that the Court was seeking to reduce the direct involvement in regional 
disputes by superpowers, “which tend to impute cosmic significance to minor conflicts”).  
 128.  GRAY, supra note 127, at 132 (describing arguments that the Court’s ruling may encourage 
low-intensity conflicts).  
 129.  Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 8, at 543 (Jennings, J., dissenting).  
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of responsive measures. Accordingly, there is some support for the notion 
that not every incident involving the use of force, such as “an isolated 
instance in which border forces may be acting without authority,”130 
constitutes an armed attack against a nation.131 It must also be 
acknowledged, however, that some use of force must be permitted in 
response to frontier incidents (especially those that pose a threat to 
individual soldiers) that do not rise to the level of an armed attack. As 
explained in Part II, it is widely accepted that the individual victims of a 
frontier incident (e.g., the soldiers under fire) must have the right to protect 
themselves. 
This poses the following dilemma for those who argue that self-
defense can be exercised only by the state. Since the U.N. Charter permits 
the use of force only by states in self-defense, and if all unit self-defense is 
an exercise of national self-defense, one must logically conclude that every 
isolated (and possibly even unauthorized) frontier incident constitutes an 
armed attack in order to justify the victim unit’s inherent right to defend 
itself with force. This conclusion reduces the gravity threshold of “armed 
attack” that the ICJ and many scholars believe is important and could thus 
lead to the types of abuse that these commentators are understandably 
concerned about.132 Alternatively, one can maintain the gravity threshold 
for armed attack, accept the ICJ’s category of “forceful countermeasures” 
outside the context of self-defense, and ignore the textual problems in 
reconciling Articles 2(4) and 51 of the U.N. Charter. 
We do not confront the same dilemma, however, if unit self-defense is 
understood to be distinct from national self-defense. Under this theory, we 
can acknowledge that certain frontier incidents may not constitute an armed 
attack but also maintain that the use of force to repel such attacks may be 
lawful, without creating a new exception to Article 2(4). Under this 
reading, the “forceful countermeasures” that the Court hypothesized might 
be lawful in the absence of an armed attack are simply those measures that 
 
 130.  Taft, supra note 54, at 302.  
 131.  See GRAY, supra note 127, at 134 (noting that in the debates on the Definition of Aggression, 
there was “general support for a distinction between frontier incidents and aggression”); see also 2009 
Independent Fact-Finding Report on Georgia, supra note 40, at 245 (adopting the ICJ’s “scale and 
effects” test, stating that “[t]here may be military operations which amount to a use of force but 
nevertheless do not yet constitute an armed attack in the sense of Art. 51 of the UN Charter”);  Eritrea 
v. Ethiopia, 2006 ILM 430, ¶ 11 (Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Comm’n 2005) (adopting an extremely 
conservative definition of armed attack, stating that “[l]ocalized border encounters between small 
infantry units, even those involving the loss of life, do not constitute an armed attack for purposes of the 
Charter”).  
 132.  Farer, supra note 126, at 113-14 (arguing “anything other than a high and conspicuous 
threshold between an armed attack justifying the exercise of self-defense and lesser forms of 
intervention . . . would invite internationalization of essentially civil conflicts”).  
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are consistent with the right of unit self-defense. Accordingly, a nation may 
not be entitled to exercise its right of national self-defense when confronted 
with a run-of-the-mill “frontier incident.” The units under attack (and only 
those units) may, however, use force to combat the threat consistent with 
the principle of unit self-defense. 
Imagine, for example, that a drunken soldier from Pacifico fires a 
single shot across the border at an Atlantico barrack. Atlantico forces take 
immediate action, firing a warning shot back across the border. Under the 
Dinstein view, Atlantico’s use of force would be justified only if the 
Pacifico soldier’s action could be characterized as an armed attack against 
Atlantico. Such a determination may cause some anxiety for the reasons 
stated above. Alternatively, by recognizing the independent right of unit 
self-defense, we can avoid this somewhat problematic conclusion. The 
firing of a single shot across the border can properly be considered a 
frontier incident, triggering the right of unit self-defense, but not an armed 
attack against Atlantico, triggering the right to both national and collective 
self-defense.   
In sum, recognizing the distinction between unit and national self-
defense mitigates some of the concerns regarding the implications of the 
ICJ opinion in the Military and Paramilitary Activities case. Of course, it 
would not alter the Court’s holding that the Sandinistas’ massive, but 
covert, support for the guerrillas did not constitute an armed attack against 
El Salvador, or that the United States’ support for the Contras was not 
justified on the basis of collective self-defense. Maintaining this distinction 
would, however, allow the international community to acknowledge that 
military forces may use force in response to true frontier incidents (that do 
not amount to armed attacks) notwithstanding the general prohibition in 
Article 2(4) on the threat or use of force by states against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of another state. 
V. UNIT SELF-DEFENSE AND INDIVIDUAL SELF-DEFENSE 
This Article has argued that there are key differences between unit and 
national self-defense, that unit self-defense is properly understood as a 
separate right derived from customary international law, and that 
maintaining this distinction can help address some criticisms in the ICJ 
jurisprudence on self-defense. One question remains to be addressed: is the 
concept of unit self-defense simply military jargon for a right of individual 
self-defense also recognized by international law? The International 
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), for example, noted that the right 
of individual self-defense is enshrined in the domestic law of every 
country, and “may be regarded as constituting a rule of customary 
TRUMBULL.FINAL.V3 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013  12:28 PM 
146 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 23:121 
international law.”133 Assuming that this is true, is there really any 
difference between unit and individual self-defense? A thorough analysis of 
this question is beyond the scope of this Article. Yet, there are substantial 
similarities in the way that the rights of individual and unit self-defense are 
commonly described. 
First, like unit self-defense, the right of individual self-defense extends 
to the defense of others. In Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, the ICTY 
stated that the “notion of self-defence may be broadly defined as providing 
a defence to a person who acts to defend or protect himself or his property 
(or another person or person’s property) against attack.”134 As stated above, 
the Rome Statute similarly provides that a person shall not be held 
criminally liable for conduct if “[t]he person acts reasonably to defend 
himself or herself or another person.”135 The U.N.’s Basic Principles on the 
Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials state: “Law 
enforcement officials shall not use firearms against persons except in self-
defence or defence of others against the imminent threat of death or serious 
injury . . . .”136 If law enforcement and ordinary citizens are permitted to 
use force to defend others, including strangers, it is hardly surprising that 
soldiers are afforded the right to defend others within their unit.137 
Second, similar to unit self-defense, individual self-defense is subject 
to the rules of necessity and proportionality. The Rome Statute, for 
example, states that a person shall not be criminally responsible if he “acts 
reasonably to defend himself . . . against an imminent and unlawful use of 
force in a manner proportionate to the degree of danger to the person.”138  
In the Kordic and Cerkez case, the ICTY wrote that self-defense may 
excuse criminal liability under international law “provided that the acts 
constitute a reasonable, necessary and proportionate reaction to the 
attack.”139 The Basic Principles similarly affirm that the use of force should 
 
 133.  Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, ¶ 451 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2001) The right of individual self-defense is also grounded in the 
natural law tradition. Blackstone, for example, stated that the right to self-defense is “the primary law of 
nature, so it is not, neither can it be …, taken away by the law of society.” John J. Merriam, Natural 
Law and Self-Defense, 206 MILITARY L. REV. 43, 70 (2010) (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *4).  
 134.  Id. ¶ 449.  
 135.  Rome Statute, supra note 38, art. 31(1)(c).  
 136.  U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Basic Principles 
on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, ¶ 9 (Sept. 7, 1990), 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/firearms.htm [hereinafter Basic Principles].  
137.    The 2005 SROE make clear that “[b]oth unit and individual self-defense includes defense of 
other U.S. military forces in the vicinity.” 2005 SROE, supra note 11, at A-2. 
 138.  Rome Statute, supra note 38, art. 31(1)(c).  
 139.  Kordic and Cerkez, ¶ 449.   
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be taken only when it is “unavoidable” and that it must be “in proportion to 
the seriousness of the offense.”140 
In sum, although this question warrants further attention, there is an 
argument that the right of unit self-defense is merely a “logical extension” 
of every soldier’s (or civilian’s) right to exercise individual self-defense.141 
Viewing unit self-defense in this manner would ground the right in a legal 
doctrine that is generally accepted in domestic and international law, add 
clarity to the circumstances in which soldiers can use force in self-defense, 
and help avoid discrepancies between local laws and the ROEs under 
which soldiers operate. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Despite the fact that soldiers around the world are informed that they 
have a right, and even an obligation, to use force when confronted with a 
hostile intent or hostile act, there is no consensus on the source of this right 
in international law. The operating assumption of some academics—that 
unit self-defense is a manifestation of national self-defense—is 
unsustainable. Naturally, in many circumstances, the right of unit and 
national self-defense will be co-extensive. An attack against a country’s 
armed forces might—due to its gravity, source, or target—trigger the right 
of both unit and national self-defense. Nevertheless, there are good reasons 
to maintain a distinction with respect to the international law bases for 
these rights. Significantly, the right of unit self-defense may be triggered 
even where the right of national self-defense is not. Although there is 
significant debate regarding the definition of “armed attack” in Article 51 
of the U.N. Charter, unit self-defense may be triggered in situations that 
few countries would consider to be an “armed attack” against a state, due to 
the gravity of the attack, the lack of a state nexus to the attack, or the fact 
that the attack was directed against individual soldiers (for example, those 
participating in a multi-national peacekeeping operation) rather than a 
particular nation. 
The stronger argument is that unit self-defense is an independent right 
recognized in customary international law, as evidenced by the numerous 
national and U.N. rules of engagement and treaties that implicitly or 
explicitly acknowledge this right. To be sure, this conclusion would be 
 
 140.  Basic Principles, supra note 136, at ¶ 5.  
 141.  Michael A. Newton, Continuum Crimes: Military Jurisdiction over Foreign Nationals Who 
Commit International Crimes, 153 MIL. L. REV. 1, 85 (1996) (“The commander’s right to protect the 
force is a logical extension of every soldier’s inherent right of self defense.”); see also Stephens, supra 
note 9, at 137 (stating that unit self-defense is “a right sui generis which exists independently under 
customary international law”). 
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bolstered by a more exhaustive review of nations’ ROE, which is difficult 
due to the fact that many ROEs are classified. Nevertheless, those ROEs 
that are available, as well as the literature on ROEs, indicate that 
governments generally accept the right of unit self-defense. 
The theory that unit self-defense is an independent right under 
international law can also help make sense of perceived inconsistencies in 
ICJ jurisprudence on the use of force. Most importantly, in the Case 
Concerning Military And Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 
the ICJ arguably created a gap between the prohibition on the use of force 
in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and the right of self-defense in Article 
51. According to the ICJ, only those attacks that meet an undefined “scale 
and effects” threshold trigger the right of national self-defense. Following 
the ICJ’s lead, some international bodies have concluded that even cross 
border military incursions do not constitute “armed attacks.” This line of 
thought is especially problematic for those who argue that unit self-defense 
is a subset of national self-defense, as military units would not be 
authorized to defend themselves against certain unlawful uses of force. Yet, 
the ICJ’s “scale and effects” test is less problematic once we acknowledge 
that the right of unit self-defense exists independently from the right of 
national self-defense. Regardless of the definition of “armed attack” in 
Article 51, soldiers always have the right to take necessary and 
proportionate measures to defend themselves (and their units) against a 
hostile act. 
Understanding the distinction between unit and national self-defense 
helps resolve some of the concerns described in this Article, but it also 
raises some additional questions. For one, the relationship between unit 
self-defense in military ROEs and the right of self-defense afforded to law 
enforcement personnel (and even civilians) deserves more attention. Like 
members of the armed forces, it is generally accepted that law enforcement 
officials can use force in self-defense or defense of others against the 
imminent threat of death or serious injury. Is the right of unit self-defense 
for members of the armed forces any different from the right afforded to 
law enforcement personnel? Similarly, can the right of unit self-defense 
extend to situations in which the use of force is necessary to accomplish 
mission objectives, as suggested by recent U.N. ROEs? This Article has 
taken the first step in clarifying the legal basis for unit self-defense, but 
also calls for further discussion on a topic that deserves greater attention by 
states and academics. 
 
